

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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10 October 1985

The Honorable George P. Shultz
The Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear George:

The House version of the Intelligence Authorization Bill gives the Director of Central Intelligence 120 days "to review and evaluate the vulnerability of confidential United States Government activities abroad, and information concerning such activities, to efforts by foreign powers to detect, monitor or counter such activities, or to acquire such information."

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The recent thorough inquiry of the Inman Panel into security in U.S. diplomatic missions, coupled with the complete inspection of information processing equipment in high threat posts, make it unlikely that an immediate general review within the specified time limits would produce more than a reprise of what has been done. Other efforts are under way both to enhance and further review security abroad. These include (a) coordination on a draft National Security Decision Directive to establish NSA-State-CIA "tiger teams" to test vulnerability of high risk posts by simulating the surveys and planning required for hostile technical penetration, and (b) action by both State and CIA to restructure their security organizations, including their technical surveillance countermeasures staffs, which bear the major responsibility for U.S. facilities abroad.

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Cooperation between the Offices of Security of State and CIA historically has been excellent, particularly with regard to technical countermeasures. CIA's Office of Research and Development is continuing important work on the Moscow new office building, begun under the auspices of my Security Committee. State Department security officers participate at all levels in the activities of that committee, including the chairmanship of its Security Advisory Group - USSR, which coordinates Intelligence Community support to the Moscow Embassy security effort. Another element of my Security Committee provides departments and agencies technical security policy guidance and training as well as analysis of technical penetration devices.

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I believe the interest of security can be served best by establishing a State Department-led effort, participated in by CIA and NSA, to conduct in-depth, on-site reviews of both the physical security and the technical security posture of every U.S. mission worldwide, including evaluation of their vulnerabilities and the hostile threat to their security integrity.

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
This proposal is for an ongoing, long-range program intended to safeguard all American facilities abroad on a continuing basis, not a short-lived response to the Moscow typewriter discoveries.

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I invite you to join me in notifying the intelligence oversight committees that we are establishing a continuing review as outlined in the paragraph above. If you agree, I offer the services of my Security Committee as an interagency host for the joint, State-chaired effort.

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Sincerely,


William J. Casey

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